Comparative Constitutional Epics by Pether, Penelope J
Working Paper Series




This paper is posted at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/wps/art130
106
Law & Literature, Vol. 21, Issue 1, p. 1–12. issn 1535-5x, electronic issn 1541-21. © 29 by The 
Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permis-
sion to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and Per-
missions website, at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintinfo.asp. DOI: 1.1525 /lal.29.21.1.1
Comparative Constitutional Epics 
Penelope Pether*
Abstract. This essay takes up Robert Cover’s account, in “Nomos and Narrative” of Constitutional 
Epics. Ranging across legal and literary texts including Toni Morrison’s Beloved, David Malouf ’s 
An Imaginary Life, the Canadian Arar Commission Report, and Bringing Them Home, the 
Report of the Australian Human Rights and Opportunity Commission’s National Inquiry into the 
Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families, it concludes that 
what comparative study of Constitutions and their Epics might yield are brutal truths and the judg-
ments of history, but also insights into how we might make of that unpromising material a nomos and 
a narrative of redemptive Constitutionalism.
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[L]ooking forward as though into unmarked space upon which history will be 
created results in recreating history.1
So writes the University of Waikato scholar of law and national identity Nan 
Seuffert, rendering diagnosis and uttering jeremiad, all in the scope of the 
lyric’s confessional brevity. Why do I call her address confessional? Seuffert’s 
lesson from Constitutional history insistently gathers “us,” about whom Vir-
ginia Woolf asked her most poignant question: “What’s an age, indeed? What 
are ‘we’?”2 Summoning inheritors of nations forged from violent disposses-
sion, institutionalized racism, and lies in the form of laws to recognize our 
shared history, she betrays hope that we can make something other than the 
past of the future citizens inhabit with others. 
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But perhaps she hopes against her better judgment. Seuffert’s unpacking of 
Benedict Anderson’s epigrammatic definition of the nation indicts:
Nations are imagined political communities . . . , which need boundaries, and 
enemies. Law is integral to the construction and maintenance of these boundar-
ies, and the identification of enemies. . . . This part of the fiction [that imagines 
nations as communities] typically masks various forms of inequality, exclusion 
and exploitation. . . .3
And her acute eye and sharp pen reveal the satirist’s tutelary disgust at 
the populist discursive construction of national identity that kills an inad-
equate and belated attempt by New Zealand’s highest court to redress the 
dispossession of the Maori: “the ‘Kiwi way of life,’ an articulated-on-the-
spot collective imagination of golden summers spent camping and barbe-
quing at the beach, swimming, walking and wading, fishing for meals and 
messing about in boats.”4 She is equally appalled by the vacuous rhetoric 
with which the elected government’s Attorney-General ushered in the leg-
islation that put a stop to common law native title to foreshore and seabed: 
“it is almost innate to being a New Zealander that you have a right to the 
foreshore and the sea.”5
Seuffert is not alone among thoughtful scholars of (Constitutional) Law 
and Literature in documenting the bleakness of the story that she reads as 
rewritten, with a repetitive ethical blindness that mimics compulsion, in post-
colonial nations like New Zealand, her native United States, and the present 
writer’s native Australia. In a contribution to one in a series of collective hom-
mages to Robert Cover’s “Nomos and Narrative,”6 Robert Post writes with 
characteristic acuity of Cover’s faith in plural human communities to make 
meaning, and thus generate laws that somehow escape the jurispathic violence 
Cover holds to be a constitutional quality of nation-states. 
Chastened by the estrangement of students in his popular Constitution-
alism seminar from Cover’s seminal text on what many read as a paean to 
“redemptive communal life,”7 a romance of the “jurisgenerative potential of 
non-statist communities,”8 Post recognizes in those students, inheritors of 
Guantánamo rather than the Vietnam that left him and Cover with no pub-
lic life that we could trust,9 a (civic) republican sensibility. This leads Post’s 
students to conceive of institutions of law and government as amenable to 
persuasion or constraint, through the performance of “public reason,”10 from 
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their potential to do violence, their capacity to destroy any law worth norma-
tive commitment. Post himself has less faith:
Even in the face of the shocking arrogance and rampant intolerance of those 
who presently dominate America, a belief in the potential of public reason 
seems the only path forward. Unlike my students, however, who assume 
that they can bestride this path with confidence, I myself can never quite 
shake the nagging fear that Cover may have seen more deeply than I care to 
acknowledge.11
What foreboding intimation was it that rereading Cover’s complex medi-
tation on Constitutional Law and Literature revealed to Post? That “there is 
a radical dichotomy between the social organization of law as power and the 
organization of law as meaning”;12 that the law of the texts that constitute the 
nation, and of legal institutions, is “itself incapable of producing the norma-
tive meaning that is life and growth”;13 that too often adjudication privileges 
“the hierarchical ordering of authority,” over the “interpretive integrity”14 
that might create new normative communities, somehow actual rather than 
imagined. And, relatively anodyne, this: that the best one can hope of the 
state is a (benign) imperialism, enabling the flourishing of the communities 
that make benevolent laws by offering them state protection, and “pursu[ing] 
[weak constitutional] ‘virtues that are justified by the need to ensure the coex-
istence of worlds of strong normative meaning.’”15
While Post discerns both Cover’s failure to register that every nomos is 
jurispathic of others, and his “skeptic[ism] of a jurisgenerative politics” of 
public reason,16 he does not perceive that if indeed Cover’s17 romantic hope 
is for a heteroglossic republic of nomoi, as some among Cover’s glossators 
have held it to be,18 it is blood kin to his own students’ contemporary civic 
republicanism. Such is the horizon of the inheritors of the death of law, 
the faithful of popular Constitutionalism. Solipsism, of course, is a risk run 
in the imaginative, interpretive, and critical business of “invite[ing] new 
worlds”19 into being, perhaps especially if we are so situated that we can 
make a virtue of our “embeddedness,” Richard Mullender’s apt term for the 
premise and ethos of communitarian political philosophy,20 or if we can ren-
der it invisible. Post knows this: the gap between his bleak vision, formed at 
the heart of “the last nation” and in neo-Imperial times, and the confidence 
of his students is constituted by Post’s abiding consciousness of his own 
alienation. 
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Alienation, the condition of the dwellers on the margins of national life, 
resonates with the thematic return of “Nomos and Narrative” to instability. 
The redemptive potential of intertextualism recurs in Cover’s text, from its 
opening invocation of Wallace Stephens on the identity of order and chaos, 
to the meditation on the “subversive force”21 located in the gap between the 
biblical narratives that gloss biblical laws and the dictates of such laws consid-
ered in isolation.22 For Cover, world-building law, the law of “commitment, 
resistance, and understanding,”23 is always in unstable relations with state 
power, and even authoritative texts always find their meaning “‘essentially 
contested.’”24 This is true for even the most etiolated of thin Constitutions, 
shorn of the complexities instantiated by the claims of its intertexts, “natural 
law, the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation . . . the 
Revolution,”25 the sources marshaled by the “radical constitutionalists” of the 
antislavery movement,26 “for primacy in the [nation’s] narrative tradition.”27 
“The uncontrolled character of meaning,” Cover wrote, “exercises a destabi-
lizing influence upon power.”28 
I will return to that insight later in this essay, but for now want to focus 
on Cover’s special pleading for Constitutional Law and Literature. The law 
and its texts of judgment are always critical sites for constituting the nation. 
Kwame Anthony Appiah writes with excoriating insight of the states of in-
equality that literature has forged.29 Law and Literature scholar Drucilla 
Cornell registers that laying down the law negotiates “the relationship be-
tween the past, embodied in the normative conventions which are passed 
down through legal precedent, and the projection of future ideals through 
which the [imagined juridical and national] community seeks to regulate 
itself.”30 Or, as Cover puts it, “[l]aw may be viewed as a system of ten-
sion or a bridge linking a concept of reality to an imagined alternative.”31 
Of explicitly Constitutional literature, Cover writes that “[n]o set of legal 
institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it 
and give it meaning,” and thus that “[f]or every constitution there is an 
epic.”32
If Cover’s theme is instability, his subject is (redemptive) Constitutiona-
lism,33 the fragile promise of the creation of integrative34 redemptive law, in 
a nation constituted with “a fault line in . . . [its] normative topography,” 
slavery, and slavery’s legacy, other forms of “violence of racial exclusion.”35 
His method entails negotiation of “the ultimate question of authority versus 
meaning,”36 and the organizing metaphor for that question, which Marianne 
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Constable frames as the “traditional concerns of jurisprudence—law and its 
relation to justice,”37 is the unstable textual dyad of nomos and narrative, in the 
genre of Constitutionalism become Constitution and Epic.38
What is a Constitutional Epic? The epic is, of course, traditionally a 
narrative about imagined communities and their times. Peter Goodrich’s 
suggestive answer, which aptly serves my purposes here, is that epics tell 
truths:
The relation of literature to law is a question of genre. . . . [T]he status of the 
legal genre is predicated upon a paradox. Law is a literature which denies its 
literary qualities. It is a play of words which asserts an absolute seriousness; 
it is a genre of rhetoric which represses its moments of invention or of fiction; 
it is a language which hides its indeterminacy in the justificatory discourse of 
judgment; it is a procedure based upon analogy, metaphor and repetition and 
yet it lays claim to being a cold or disembodied prose, a science without either 
poetry or desire; it is a narrative which assumes the epic proportions of truth; it 
is, in short, a speech or writing which forgets the violence of the word and the 
terror or jurisdiction of the text. Law, conceived as a genre of literature and as a 
practice of poetics, can thus only be understood through the very act of forget-
ting, through the denial, the negation, or the repression by means of which it 
institutes its identity, its life, its fictive forms.39 
Goodrich also suggests here that the literature constituted by law’s own texts 
is chronically incapable of telling the truth about itself.
What truths might we learn from Constitutional Epics? And where might 
we find them? I have recently made a case for legal “factions,” “artful repre-
sentations of the real, . . . hav[ing] an especially strong claim to be law’s nar-
rative supplements,” positing that: 
their inhabiting of the borderlands of fact and fiction, law and literary jour-
nalism, make them generic doubles for the texts of judgment. Both genres— 
faction and what Australians call judgments and Americans legal opinions—
make coherent and thus satisfactory narratives out of the messy contingency of 
evidence and the everyday, at the same time unwittingly drawing attention to 
the author’s editorial legerdemain and normative vision. In Cold Blood exempli-
fies Cover’s insight that the complex contested meanings that we make from 
our engagement with narrative have a peculiar aptitude to unsettle law’s total-
izing claims to normative authority and interpretive orthodoxy: there is more 
than one way to read the law, and thus to make it. 40 
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Capote told the nation and its people a story of the pathology constitutive 
of their nation and the law that was made and administered in their name: the 
constitutional violence and radical uncertainty of life in a nation peopled with 
insular nomoi and state laws that discriminate oppressively between “us” and 
“others.” At the same time he manifested both the allure and the risks of an 
advocate getting “too close to the client.” Writing from a nation where the 
most recent appointee to the Supreme Court fawningly touted his conserva-
tive credentials when seeking an Executive government appointment early in 
his career,41 and where the paradigmatic client of the (Constitutional) lawyers 
who constitute a significant number of the federal appellate bench is the gov-
ernment, that latter truth offered to “us”—lawyers and citizens alike—by In 
Cold Blood is a species of cautionary tale.
Worse than that can happen to constitutionalism, of course. Texts that ges-
ture towards what that worst might be include the “torture memos” written 
by Jay Bybee and John Yoo,42 then both of the increasingly inaptly-named 
Justice Department, now a federal appellate judge and Boalt Hall law profes-
sor respectively, lawyers far too close to their client, executive government, 
with little awareness of being servants of the law. In the Australian constitu-
tional context, one might look to the contention of the Solicitor-General of the 
Australian government in submissions he made to the Australian High Court 
in Kartinyeri v. Commonwealth (Hindmarsh Island Bridge Case) that the Aus-
tralian government could make racially discriminatory laws to the detriment 
of Australia’s indigenous peoples because the history of the passage of the 
constitutional provision authorizing the Australian legislature to make “spe-
cial laws” for “the people of any race”43 had a “direct racist content” which 
“infected . . . [the constitutional grant of legislative power] with a power of 
adverse operation.”44
Australia’s postcolonial circumstances are complicated ones. This is in part 
because, as the foregoing suggests, the appeal to address the nation’s “ghosts” 
and to “enlarge the [nation’s] spirit”45 emerges as strongly—perhaps more 
strongly—from inside the nation’s borders as from without, as a result of 
the violent dispossession and institutionalized genocide practiced by the 
British, colonial, and later Australian states, and their peoples, under color 
of state laws, against Australian indigenous peoples. It is also because Aus-
tralia has engaged in neocolonial practices in the “postcolonial” period, for 
example in fashioning the “Pacific Solution” to the claims of asylum seekers 
in 21, which involved using the Navy to prevent intending asylum seekers 
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reaching Australia, and to land them in any Pacific nation that would agree to 
take them. 
A “factional” text I have recently proposed46 as an Australian Constitu-
tional Epic is David Marr and Marian Wilkinson’s Dark Victory, which relent-
lessly documents that epic tragedy of repetitive and unredeemed neocolonial 
violence, telescoped into the weeks immediately before and after September 
11, 21. Banking (in the event prudentially) on John Howard’s ruthlessly un-
sentimental vision of “white Australia’s” intolerance of “others” and enthu-
siastic embracing of the use of state violence against “weak, vulnerable, and 
desperate”47 others, in this case Muslim refugees from Iraq, Iran, and Afghan-
istan, fleeing “some of the most brutal and repressive regimes on earth, so 
brutal we were going to war to crush them”48 and seeking asylum in Australia, 
the Howard government shored up its electoral fortunes by using the navy to 
drive intending asylum-seekers out of Australian waters, theoretically back to 
Indonesia, in some cases to their death at sea, in others to “holding” destina-
tions including Christmas Island, en route to destinations including detention 
camps in the Pacific Island nations of Nauru and Papua New Guinea. 
As Maher and Wilkinson frame Australia’s state law in the wake of 9/11:
The xenophobia of Australians was to be shown democratic respect. To contest 
the prevailing fear of boat people was simply unpatriotic. Howard had found a 
perfect issue in border protection: tough but popular, crude racism combined 
with genuine concern for the security of the country, a concern intensified by 
the terrorist attacks on America. It was race wrapped in a flag.49
They also, however, document evidence of redemptive Constitutional 
Narratives, infused with the jurisgenerative ethics of “commitment, resis-
tance, and understanding”50: 
[E]loquent voices on the front line were now telling their stories. On polling 
day [in the November, 21, Federal elections] the Australian reported the re-
sponse of a senior officer on the [Australian Navy vessel] Tobruk ferrying boat 
people to Nauru. “In the middle of the night I looked down from the bridge”, 
said the officer. “There’s two hatches open and it’s hot. Through one, I could 
see a hundred people lying there on stretchers. I thought, ‘It’s like a slave ship’. 
I thought, ‘Jesus, I thought we were Australians. I thought we were a good 
bloody country.’ On board, they don’t like to use the word prisoners, but they 
are. At Ashmore Reef it hit me—shit we’re going like South Africa. If Australia  
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continues down this political path, it will be like apartheid here. And people 
will think that’s what we do here. But it’s not what we should do here.” The 
unnamed officer reported divisions in the navy between those who supported 
Operation Relex and those who thought the government was turning the ser-
vice into “legally sanctioned people-traffickers”. Having decided these people 
were refugees, the officer concluded he could take no further part in the opera-
tion. “They’re fleeing the governments the Americans are trying to destroy, for 
Christ’s sake. They’re fleeing persecution.”51
Maher and Wilkinson’s “faction,” then, speaks narrative truth to public legal 
power, presents telling stories that deny state law denial of its jurispathic vio-
lence, makes it remember its repetitive histories of racist persecution. 
How much of this epic constitutional reach derives from what I have ar-
gued is a peculiarly destabilizing narrative genre? Other scholars of Law and 
Literature have made special claims for the privileged status of canonical fic-
tional literary texts; Robin West makes the case like this: that one can “find 
in canonical works of literature philosophical insights about the meaning of 
law and the promise of justice.”52 What of Cover himself on the subject of re-
demptive narratives? He suggests that Constitutional Epics with redemptive 
power must tell a story about the Constitution “close enough to reveal a line of 
human endeavor that brings them into temporary or partial reconciliation.”53 
Too utopian, and visionary narratives “risk the failure of the conversion of vi-
sion into reality, and thus, the breaking of the tension.”54 Paraphrasing Cover, 
at this point “they may be [narratives], but they are no longer [narratives] of 
the law.”55 Further, “[b]ecause the nomos is but the process of human action 
stretched between vision and reality,” for “interpretation” to become “legal 
meaning”56 requires two acts of faith. The first “entails a commitment to pro-
jecting the understanding of the norm at work in our reality through all possi-
ble worlds unto the teleological vision that the interpretation implies.”57 That 
is, it requires putting oneself “on the line.”58 The second derives from Cover’s 
insight that “[n]arrative is the literary genre for the objectification of value.”59 
Once again deploying the trope of destabilizing différence, Cover reasons,
[c]reation of legal meaning entails . . . subjective commitment to an objectified 
understanding of a demand. It entails the disengagement of the self from the 
“object” of law, and at the same time requires an engagement to that object as 
a faithful “other.” The metaphor of separation permits the allegory of dedica-
tion. This objectification of the norms to which one is committed frequently, 
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perhaps always, entails a narrative—a story of how the law, now object, came 
to be, and more importantly, how it came to be one’s own.60
My own suggestion is that both canonical texts and what I will call quasi-
legal texts, exemplified61 by the Commonwealth genre of the Royal Com-
mission Report, characteristically the documentary product of inquiries by 
eminent lawyers on behalf of government and community into crises that the 
law itself is unequal to addressing—both genres of epic texts, in Goodrich’s 
sense, as in others62—share with factions their capacity to exercise a pecu-
liarly63 “destabilizing influence upon power.”64 Legal factions in the vein of 
In Cold Blood, Dark Victory, Mailer’s The Executioner’s Song, and Australian 
novelist and lawyer John Bryson’s Evil Angels—his account of the wrongful 
conviction of Lindy Chamberlain of the murder of her baby daughter Azaria, 
in what is sometimes called “the Dingo Baby Case”—are fertile ground for 
Constitutional Narratives. Their generic quality as the Janus face of the con-
tingent texts of judgment invite interrogation of legal texts’ claims to produce 
fact and not fiction. Canonical “legal fictions” have such power because they 
have no truck with the positivists’ Benthamite dogma: law always involves 
questions about the nomos as well as the letter of the texts of state power. 
As to the quasi-legal genre exemplified by the Royal Commission Report, 
it destabilizes the claims of those texts of state power to speak “the whole 
truth,” because it attempts to rewrite legal discourse so that it is capable of 
doing justice to alternative jurisprudences,65 compelling an audience for the 
voiceless. More than this, too, such documents typically are the products of 
inquiries forced onto the state, frequently into its own action or inaction, by a 
populace that does not believe the “authorized truth” the state has told them. 
Consider the recent example of the massive, three-volume public version 
of the Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar, produced by the Commis-
sion of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher 
Arar,66 a Canadian national of Syrian birth who was, with the cooperation of 
the Canadian authorities, arrested and detained by the United States in New 
York while lawfully in transit through Kennedy Airport, and “extraordinarily 
rendered,” to Syria, where he was imprisoned, tortured, and otherwise mis-
treated, even though, as the Commissioner reported, “there is nothing to 
indicate that Mr. Arar committed an offense or that his activities constitute 
a threat to the activities of Canada.”67 The Commissioner records that the 
“public inquiry” he conducted was instigated by the Canadian government 
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in response to “mounting public pressure.”68 Not only are the Commission’s 
recommendations replete with insistence on the accountability of Canadian 
law enforcement and intelligence-gathering agencies to the public and to ro-
bust democratic norms, but the Report itself explicitly resists the jurispathic 
claims of state law:
It should be noted that there are portions of this public version [of the Re-
port] that have been redacted on the basis of an assertion of national security 
confidentiality by the Government that the Commissioner does not accept. 
Some or all of this redacted information may be publicly disclosed in the fu-
ture after the final resolution of the dispute between the Government and the 
Commission.69
If Constitutional Epics, then, have a privileged capacity to “bespeak the range 
of . . . [“our”] commitments” and “resources for justification, condemnation, 
and argument” that enable us to “struggle to live [‘our’] law,”70 that capacity 
derives in significant part from their supplementarity, and the practice of inter-
textual reading of the texts of state law “against the grain.” This suggests—as 
do the dual conventional cases made for studying comparative Constitutional 
law, generating profound insights about constitutionalism, including those that 
come from estranging the familiar, and enabling the “bringing home” of mate-
rial constitutional change—that a study of comparative Constitutional Epics 
has a special utility for the redemptive71 Constitutionalist.
This essay has already inaugurated an inquiry into Comparative Consti-
tutional Epics under cover of comparison—intertextuality by another name. 
What emerges from a self-conscious comparison of the Constitutional Epics 
In Cold Blood, Dark Victory, and the Arar Commission Report? Some confir-
mation, at least, of Seuffert’s thesis that nations need enemies, that imagined 
communities imply “inequality, exclusion and exploitation,” and that this can 
occur at home as well as abroad; that while citizenship may be partial, “the 
alien,” like “the criminal” or the “suspected terrorist,” is especially vulnerable; 
and that post- or supra-national formations, like the Empire, or globalization, 
may paradoxically extend the reach of the violence of the nation-state. Acts 
of lawlessness under cover of state power give rise to others: if Guantánamo 
Bay first operated as a holding camp to block the passage of Haitian refugees 
to the United States,72 later became the paradigmatic “jurisdiction of excep-
tion” in the “War on Terror,” and prompted the Australian government to use 
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a Nauruan detention camp as the geographical location of the “Pacific 
Solution,”73 it was because in each of these cases the camps were “designed 
as much to keep [detainees] . . . out of the legal system as the territory” of the 
United States or Australia.74 Thus the legislative excisions of parts of Austra-
lian territory, like Christmas Island, explicitly predicated on denying refugees 
who landed or were brought there for processing access to refugee status un-
der Australian law, because to the Australian courts.75 
Comparative study of Constitutional Epics might also suggest the price 
even “we” could pay for the violence of the jurispathic state, the jurisdiction 
of “pain and death”:76 Maher Arar, after all, was someone much like many 
of the readership of this essay: middle class, university-educated, a citizen 
of a first world democracy.77 And as Duncan Wallace, the Australian Naval 
Reserve officer and psychiatrist who had served on the Arunta, an Austra-
lian Navy vessel that saw action in “Operation Relex,” the vector for the 
“Pacific Solution,” wrote to the Australian press of the violent intervention 
to block the Islamic refugees’ access to asylum rights under international 
and Australian law:
Not only are these actions physically dangerous to members of the [Australian 
Defence Forces], but it is my expert opinion, as a senior consultant psychiatrist 
to the Royal Australian Navy, that they are highly likely to be harmful to the 
psychological health and moral development of all members involved. Nearly 
everyone I spoke to that was involved in these operations knew that what they 
were doing was wrong . . . the hardhearted who speak loudly about the need for 
stern deterrent actions to solve this problem have not seen the faces of the boat 
people in their miserable conditions, imploring us for help.78
A similar insight is pressed home, albeit in more metaphysical vein, by Da-
vid Malouf ’s An Imaginary Life, a candidate for the title of “great Australian 
Constitutional novella.” Exiled beyond the end of the “civilized” world for 
reasons that were not publicly revealed, the dying poet Ovid, whose greatest 
work was the subversive epic of love and transformation, the Metamorphoses, 
found in Malouf ’s imagined exile the regard for and of another—the feral 
abandoned Child whom he persuaded his hosts to take in, and saved from 
those hosts when they turned against him—that generated in him “a capacity 
for belief that is nowhere to be found in his own writings.”79 Negotiating the 
passage between self and other, foreign and domestic, exile and community, 
Malouf ’s Ovid mused:
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For these people it is a new concept, play. How can I make them understand that 
till I came here it was the only thing I knew? Everything I ever valued before 
this was valuable only because it was useless, because time spent upon it was 
not demanded but freely given, because to play is to be free. Free is not a word 
that exists, I think, in their language. Nothing here is free of its own nature, its 
own law.
But we are free after all. We are bound not by the laws of our nature but the 
ways we can imagine ourselves breaking out of those laws without doing vio-
lence to our essential being. We are free to transcend ourselves. If we have the 
imagination for it.
My little flowerpots are as subversive here as my poems were in Rome. They 
are the beginning, the first of the changes. Some day, I know, I shall find one of 
our women stopping as she crosses the yard with a bag of seed to smell one of 
my gaudy little blooms. She will, without knowing it, be taking a first step into 
a new world.80 
What more might we learn if we read generic like against like, two quasi-
legal Constitutional Epics: the first, the Arar Commission Report; the second 
from Australia rather than Canada, and preceding the events of 9/11: Bring-
ing Them Home, the Report of the Australian Human Rights and Opportunity 
Commission’s National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Children from Their Families?81 And if we read them in turn 
against the texts of positive law with which they share a subject? First, such 
a comparison brings home the inadequacy of the institutions, discourses, and 
texts of positive law to do justice to state violence, visited on the powerless, 
of the magnitude that each report documents with relentless exhaustiveness: 
Arar v. Ashcroft 82 is a monument to narrow legalism, finding every opportu-
nity to deny Maher Arar a forum in which his claims of state violence might 
be done justice to.83 
In Kruger v. Commonwealth (Stolen Generations Case)84 the Australian High 
Court denied the claims of members of the stolen generations that had chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the Aboriginals Ordinance 1918 (NT), one of 
the legislative acts of Australian state and territory governments that had au-
thorized the forced removal of indigenous children from their families, and 
had sought damages for that alleged constitutional breach. While the Court’s 
justices came to differing doctrinal conclusions about the applicable Con-
stitutional law, what each had in common—with the possible exception of 
Justice Toohey, who, while denying the relief sought on the basis that the 
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Aboriginals Ordinance was not unconstitutional on the grounds of unequal 
treatment on its face, insisted on reading Leeth v. Commonwealth85 as embody-
ing a constitutional guarantee of substantive equality86—is positivist narrow-
ness. Rejecting the possibilities offered by a nascent jurisprudence of “thick” 
judicial power implied by Article III of the Australian Constitution, instan-
tiated by Justices Deane and Toohey in Leeth,87 Justice Gaudron made the 
Court, the Stolen Generations, and the nation hostages to history:
It would not appear that [a doctrine of substantive equality] . . . was adopted in 
the drafting of the Constitution. . . . In Leeth Deane and Toohey JJ expressed 
the view that such a doctrine had been adopted in the Constitution by necessary 
implication by reason of its conceptual basis and because it is “implicit in the 
Constitution’s separation of judicial power from legislative and executive pow-
ers and the vesting of judicial power in designated ‘courts.’”
In referring to the conceptual basis of the Constitution, Deane and Toohey JJ 
had in mind the preamble and covering cl 3 of the Commonwealth of Austra-
lia Constitution Act which refer to the agreement of the people of the various 
colonies to unite in a Federal Commonwealth. Their Honors took the view 
that “[i]mplicit in that free agreement was the notion of the inherent equality 
of the people as the parties to the compact”. It may be observed that a degree 
of equality was lacking in the free agreement of which their Honours spoke, 
in that the referendum expressing that agreement excluded most women and 
many Aboriginals. But the important thing is that the Constitution to which 
the people agreed plainly envisages inequality in the operation of laws made 
under it. Moreover, those who framed the constitution deliberately chose not 
to include a provision guaranteeing due process or equal protection of the laws 
and it was with those omissions that the people agreed to the Constitution. It 
is not possible, in my view, to read into the fact of agreement any implications 
which do not appear from the document upon which agreement was reached. 
Not only does a doctrine of equality . . . not appear from the Constitution, but 
the very basis on which it was drafted was that matters such as that were better 
left to parliament and the democratic process.88
Bringing Them Home both undermines the authority of the Kruger major-
ity’s decision to read the Constitution and the history of its drafting in the nar-
rowest and most literal of ways and is a forceful adjunct to Seuffert’s warn-
ing about the price of repeating history. The Commission—headed by Mick 
Dodson, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commis-
sioner, and Sir Ronald Wilson, a retired High Court justice and the President 
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of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission—opened its re-
port with an address to history and to nation, concluding by quoting the then 
Australian head of state, Governor-General Sir William Deane, yet another 
retired High Court justice:
The histories we trace are complex and pervasive. Most significantly the actions 
of the past resonate in the present and will continue to do so in the future. The 
laws, policies and practices which separated Indigenous children from their 
families have contributed direction to the alienation of Indigenous societies 
today.
For individuals, their removal as children and the abuse they experienced at the 
hands of the authorities or their delegates have permanently scarred their lives. 
The harm continues in later generations, affecting their children and grand-
children. . . .
The truth is that the past is very much with us today, in the continuing devasta-
tion of the lives of indigenous Australians. . . .89
Bringing Them Home went on to quote from the Governor-General’s de-
scription of the “past dispossession, oppression and degradation of Aborigi-
nal peoples,” “done . . . in the name of the community or with the authority 
of government,” which had produced “[t]he present plight, in terms of health, 
employment, living conditions and self-esteem” of Australia’s indigenous 
peoples, insisting on the recognition “of the extent to which present disadvan-
tage flows from past injustice and oppression.”90
That “present disadvantage” stems from the individual, familial, com-
munity and transgenerational effects of the widespread forcible separation 
of indigenous Australian children from their families in the period between 
the early nineteenth century and the early 19s. Under color of successive 
policies of colonization, the euphemistically labeled “protection” and seg-
regation of indigenous from white Australians, the absorption of the black 
race into the white, assimilation of those who survived these earlier geno-
cidal practices into white society, and “child welfare” that was much more 
likely to consider a black child as a candidate for separation from her par-
ents in the interests of her welfare than her white peer, black children were 
hunted down; often literally ripped from their mothers’ arms; institutional-
ized in the grimmest of circumstances; pressed into servitude that bore the 
hallmarks of chattel slavery; subjected to sexual violence and coercion; lied 
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to about their race, their identity, and families, including about long histories 
of fruitless attempts by their distraught parents to find them; taught to believe 
that they were worthless. 
The “disadvantage” that results includes low educational achievement 
and stratospheric levels of unemployment; endemic poverty and disease, 
including high incidence of diseases that would normally be found in the 
fourth world and not in the heart of a wealthy Western democracy; over-
representation in the criminal justice system and in correctional facilities; 
horrifying levels of addiction and substance abuse; widespread community 
cultures of violence, especially violence to intimates and family members, 
and self-harm (including, most notably, petrol-sniffing and suicide); and 
short life expectancy, especially among young black men, who die vio-
lently, at high rates. Even among such a transgenerationally impoverished 
group, those indigenous children forcibly removed from their families do 
much worse. To take just a few examples from the devastating statistics 
reproduced in Bringing Them Home, indigenous children “removed in 
childhood” from their families are “twice as likely to report having been 
arrested by police and having been convicted of an offence”; “three times 
as likely to report having been in gaol”; “twice as likely to report current 
use of illicit substances”; and “much more likely to report intravenous use 
of illicit substances” as those “who were raised by their families or in their 
communities.”91
Such are the “dangerous supplements” that Bringing Them Home’s Consti-
tutional Epic brings home to the High Court’s account of what the constitu-
tion does and does not provide. Even more telling tales emerge from its use 
of survivor testimony, which breaks the text of legal analysis to devastating 
effect. Take, for example, this testimony from a woman from the same Aus-
tralian state as, and at most a few years older than, me:
The thing that hurts the most is that they didn’t care about who they put us 
with. As long as it looked like they were doing their job, it just didn’t matter. 
They put me with one family and the man of the house used to come down and 
use me whenever he wanted to . . . Being raped over and over and there was 
no-one I could turn to. They were supposed to look after me and protect me, 
but no-one ever did.
Confidential evidence 689, New South Wales: woman removed to Parramatta Girls’ 
Home at the age of 13 in the 1960s and subsequently placed in domestic service.92
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Reflecting specifically on the transgenerational effect of removal, the same 
survivor also reported:
That’s another thing that we find hard is giving our children love. Because we 
never had it. So we don’t know how to tell our kids that we love them. All we 
do is protect them. I can’t even cuddle my kids ‘cause I never ever got cuddled. 
The only time was when I was getting raped and that’s not what you’d call a 
cuddle, is it?93
Another woman much of my age reported on the transgenerational effect 
removal had on her father:
The interesting thing was that he was such a great provider . . . He was a great 
provider and had a great name and a great reputation. Now, when this intru-
sion occurred it had a devastating impact upon him and upon all those values he 
believed in and that he put in place in his life which included us, and so therefore 
I think the effect upon Dad was so devastating. And when that destruction oc-
curred, which was the destruction of his own personal private family which 
included us, it had a very strong devastating effect upon him, so much so that 
he never ever recovered from the trauma that had occurred . . .
Progressively the shattering effect continued in my father’s life to the point that 
he couldn’t see the sense in reuniting the family again. He had lost all confi-
dence as a parent and as an adult in having the ability to be able to reunite our 
family.
Confidential evidence 25, Victoria: Woman removed with her sisters from their fa-
ther and grandmother in the 19s.94
Both the Arar Commission Report and Bringing Them Home, then, bespeak 
the redemptive potential of Constitutional Epics of their type: showing how 
unpalatable truths about how “we” treat others, under the putative authoriza-
tion of circumstances of national necessity, testify to the inadequacy of the 
present language of law to doing justice, and bespeak the ability of a differ-
ently constituted legal language to make it possible.
They also record the violence visited in the nation’s name on those who are 
constructed as “different,” marginal to national identity, excessive to model 
citizenship. In each case, to differing degrees, they show how state law’s vio-
lent intervention in the family lives of oppressed communities putatively 
“within” the nation is characteristic of jurispathic state law. The poignant 
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documentary report of Professor Stephen J. Toope, the Arar Commission’s 
Fact Finder,95 concludes thus:
Mr. Maher Arar was subjected to torture in Syria. The effects of that expe-
rience, and of consequent events and experiences in Canada, have been pro-
foundly negative for Mr. Arar and his family. Although there have been few 
lasting physical effects, Mr. Arar’s psychological state was seriously damaged 
and he remains fragile. His relationships with his family have been significantly 
impaired. Economically, the family has been devastated.96
Likeness; difference. If An Imaginary Life is a candidate for the title of the 
Great Australian Novella, Toni Morrison’s Beloved has been anointed the 
Great American Novel.97 Cover’s diagnosis of the nation’s constitutional fault 
line makes a supplementary case for the novel as America’s Great Constitu-
tional Epic. Morrison’s novel is a canonical fictional narrative on the theme 
of what all of “us,” the nation, its paradigmatic included citizens and their 
marginalized others, inherit from the violent legalized destruction of the 
family lives of enslaved African Americans. Is Robin West right, when she 
makes claims for the peculiar, philosophical ability of canonical literature to 
tell epic truths? 
Beloved is a meditation on the price paid for generations of “unspeak-
able thoughts, unspoken,”98 and the possibility of redemption when the un-
livable, intolerable, truth, the “jungle whitefolks planted in” blacks, and in 
themselves,99 is outed, and made to identify itself; when women like Sethe, 
Baby Suggs, Denver, and the haunted, haunting ghost Beloved herself are 
“free at last to be what they liked, see what they saw and say whatever was 
on their minds.”100 Morrison’s account of the work’s genesis begins with her 
coming into the strange recognition of her freedom at the passage in her own 
history when she had decided to stop working for others, to write:
I think now it was the shock of liberation that drew my thoughts to what “free” 
could possibly mean to women. In the eighties, the debate was still roiling: 
equal pay, equal treatment, access to professions, schools . . . and choice with-
out stigma. To marry or not. To have children or not. Inevitably these thoughts 
led me to the different history of black women in this country—a history in 
which marriage was discouraged, impossible, or illegal; in which birthing chil-
dren was required, but “having” them, being responsible for them—being, in 
other words, their parent—was as out of the question as freedom. Assertions of 
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parenthood under conditions peculiar to the logic of institutionalized enslave-
ment were criminal.101
Telling once again paradigmatic stories of what we label genocide in other 
places, with abundant death dealt out in briefer episodes, more obviously 
violent times, Morrison tells a story uncannily like that of the survivors who 
speak at last in Bringing Them Home. Wresting every possibility from the 
genre of literary novel, she employs the pregnant violence of metaphor to 
testify to unspeakable truths, unspoken. The rape she submits to in order to 
pay for an epitaph to her murdered baby’s gravestone, remembered, infects 
love with obscenity:
“For a baby she throws a powerful spell,” said Denver.
“No more powerful than the way I loved her,” Sethe answered and there it was 
again. The welcoming cool of unchiseled headstones; the one she selected to 
lean against on tiptoe, her knees wide open as any grave. Pink as a fingernail 
it was, and sprinkled with glittering chips. Ten minutes, he said. You got ten 
minutes I’ll do it for free.102
And the repetitive violence of the forced removal of children, and mothers, 
and fathers from families that the logic of slavery dictated—”[a]ll of Baby’s 
life, as well as Sethe’s own, men and women were moved around like check-
ers,” such that “[a]nybody Baby Suggs knew, let alone loved, who hadn’t run 
off or been hanged, got rented or loaned out, bought up, brought back, stored 
up, mortgaged, won, stolen, or seized”—leaves indelible traces, rewrites itself 
everywhere it can:
Baby Suggs rubbed her eyebrows. “My first born. All I can remember is how 
she loved the bottom of bread. Can you beat that? Eight children and that’s all 
I remember.”
“That’s all you let yourself remember,” Sethe had told her, but she was down 
to one herselfóone alive, that is, the boys chased off by the dead one, and her 
memory of Buglar was fading fast. Howard at least had a head shape nobody 
could forget. As for the rest, she worked hard to remember as close to nothing 
as was safe.103
Morrison’s epic poetry has a peculiar power to render the wholeness 
of truth. But perhaps it yields its deepest truths, meriting the generic label 
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philosophy, or jurisprudence, when it is read against its companion pieces, 
Dark Victory and Bringing Them Home. Reading Beloved in this way can lead 
us “to recognize . . . a pattern that reveals a meaning.”104 
The epic truth of these constitutive fictions of national identity is that 
“constitutional inequality [is] the other self of the rule of (Constitutional) law, 
always imminent, always encroaching, always requiring vigilance to discern 
when it comes constitutional.”105 In the aftermath of originary violence, so 
such a Law and Literature project might insist, the nation responsible for that 
violence must reimagine, envision, dream itself into being, but if it does so 
without insistently remembering its origins and its history, it will be at a con-
siderable price. 
Perhaps redemptive Comparative Constitutionalism, then, requires restor-
ing our Constitutional Epics to historical contexts: texts like the literary his-
tory that is Stephen Weisenburger’s Modern Medea: A Family Story of Slavery 
and Child-Murder from the Old South, which marshals and reads the texts that 
tell the story of Morrison’s muse, Margaret Garner, a fugitive slave who killed 
one child and tried to kill the others when recaptured by the slave master who 
was in all probability the murdered child’s father; and Pamela Bridgewater’s 
powerful legal history, “Un/Re/Dis Covering Slave Breeding in Thirteenth 
Amendment Jurisprudence.”106 Bridgewater documents the slave-breeding 
economy in which Margaret Garner existed, arguing that “reproductive ex-
ploitation via forced sex and forced reproduction”107 was as constitutive of 
slavery as forced labor. The nation-forging she seeks to supplement, how-
ever, is that presently constituted by the doctrine that gives such life to the 
Reconstruction Amendments as they have, at this point in the history of “our” 
Constitution. 
What comparative study of Constitutions and their Epics might yield, then, 
are brutal truths and the judgments of history, but also, if we choose, insights 
into how we might make of that unpromising material a nomos and a narra-
tive of redemptive Constitutionalism. Cover’s rich text is uncharacteristically 
plain about what the path to such redemption entails:
[T]hose who write a nation’s epic make choices about the ancestors they invoke, 
as do constitutional courts. “The normative universe,” of the nation, he ob-
serves, “is held together by the force of interpretive commitments—some small 
and private, others immense and public. These commitments—of officials and 
of others—do determine what the law means and what law shall be.”108
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Constitutional judges must choose interpretive integrity over hierarchy,109 
peace over violence.110 That which is capable of moving them to such a choice, 
to “fac[ing] the commitments entailed in their judicial office and their law,”111 
is “the stories the resisters tell, the lives they live, the law they make.”112
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